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This paper reports an experiment designed to test whether prior consultation within a 
group affects subsequent individual decision making in tasks where demonstrability of 
correct solutions is low. In our experiment subjects considered two paintings created by 
two different artists and were asked to guess which artist made each painting. We 
observed answers given by individuals under two treatments: in one, subjects were 
allowed the opportunity to consult with other participants before making their private 
decisions; in the other there was no such opportunity. Our primary findings are that 
subjects in the first treatment evaluate the opportunity to consult positively but they 
perform significantly worse and earn significantly less. 
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In many walks of life, individuals often consult, either formally or informally, with others 
before taking important decisions. Obvious examples include borrowers or investors consulting 
with financial advisors before making decisions; or employers consulting with hiring managers 
and HR specialists before hiring new employees; or individuals talking with family or friends, in 
addition to health professionals, in advance of choosing between alternative medical 
interventions. With the growth of the internet, sources of ‘advice’ are expanding rapidly while 
the costs of accessing them are often very low. But here, as elsewhere, the quality of advice 
obtained may be difficult to assess raising interesting questions about when advice should be 
followed and the conditions under which consulting with others can be expected to improve (or 
worsen) individual decision making.  
One body of literature which might inform understanding of the influence of consultation 
on individual decisions is an extensive literature that has examined the comparative success of 
decisions made by individuals versus decisions made by groups. A considerable body of 
evidence now supports the claim that groups can often ‘outperform’ individuals. The bulk of this 
literature comes from experimental research in social psychology examining behavior in decision 
problems that have correct solutions and thus have a meaningful criterion for assessing decision 
accuracy. Within this literature, a widely reported finding is that groups are more likely to report 
the correct answer (see, e.g., Hastie, 1986; Laughlin et al., 2003; Laughlin et al., 2006, and 
references therein). Economists have also compared individual and group decisions with most of 
this research focused on interactive decisions
1 where the players are either groups of individuals 
or single individuals; in this context, a common result, across a variety of games, is that groups’ 
decisions more closely track standard game theoretic predictions.
2 
                                                            
1 There is a smaller literature investigating the incidence of preference ‘anomalies’ comparing groups and 
individuals. For example, Charness et al. (2007) find that failures to perform Bayesian updating and violations of 
first-order stochastic dominance decrease with the size of the group. Sutter (2007) finds that, whereas groups are as 
prone to as individuals to myopic loss aversion, group decision-making attenuates its effects. Some studies report 
that groups are as prone as individuals to other decision anomalies, e.g. the endowment and the compromise effect 
(Munro and Popov, 2009), and violations of expected utility theory (Bone et al., 1999; Rockenbach et al., 2007). 
2 See, e.g., Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) in the ultimatum game; Cox (2002) and Kugler et al. (2007) in the trust game; 
Bornstein et al. (2004) in the centipede game; Kocher and Sutter (2005) in a beauty-contest game; Luhan et al. (2009) 
in the dictator game. Cooper and Kagel (2005) find that groups play more strategically than individuals in signaling 
games. Another strand of literature in economics has studied the differences in equilibrium selection between groups 
and individuals in coordination games (Charness and Jackson, 2007; Croson and Fatas, 2009; Feri et al., 2010).   
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The fact that groups often perform better than individuals, in some quantifiable sense, 
suggests the possibility that consultation with a group, prior to an individual decision, might have 
analogous improving effects. However, such a conclusion may be premature. One reason for 
caution is the limited scope of direct evidence bearing on how deliberation within a group, prior 
to an individual decision, affects the quality of the latter. Two recent contributions which do 
directly address this, point to a positive impact of prior group deliberation on subsequent 
individual decisions. Maciejovsky et al. (2010) report that subjects who have solved decision 
problems as part of a group subsequently perform better as individuals in similar decision tasks. 
Charness et al. (2010) find that group consultation mitigates some decision anomalies found in 
individual choice experiments.
3  While these recent results chime with the broader literature 
comparing the success of individuals and groups, like many of the studies reviewed by Hastie 
(1986), both of them also share a design feature which may limit their generalizability: that 
feature is the use of tasks which have demonstrably correct solutions. 
 The use of tasks with correct solutions is a natural strategy to follow in any decision 
experiment where pursuit of the research question requires some unambiguous criterion of task 
success. But, the use of tasks with demonstrably correct solutions merits further consideration. 
We will say that the (correct) solution to a decision problem is fully demonstrable, in a given 
decision environment, when someone who knows the solution (and/or how to identify it) can 
convey that knowledge to any other individual facing the same decision.
4 In previous research, 
demonstrability has usually been implemented by using tasks which have correct answers that 
can be identified through the application of some commonly understood, or understandable, 
reasoning process (for instance, the task of finding the solution to a mathematical problem such 
as multiplying two numbers together; or that of identifying the solution to some logical reasoning 
problem, such as the famous ‘selection task’ of Wason, 1966). In such cases, while some 
individuals may not independently arrive at the correct solution, the task is demonstrable to the 
extent that they will recognize the solution when presented with suitable arguments to identify it.  
                                                            
3  Specifically, they find significantly lower violations of the conjunction rule among decision-makers who are 
allowed to deliberate with other participants before submitting their answers. 
4 A richer discussion of the concept of demonstrability is provided by Laughlin and Ellis (1986). On their account, 
demonstrability requires four conditions: i) participants must reach a consensus on a common verbal or 
mathematical system; ii) there must be sufficient information within the system for reaching a solution; iii) the group 
members who are unable to reach a solution by themselves must have sufficient knowledge of the system to 
recognize and accept the correct solution; and iv) those who are able to reach the correct solution must have 
sufficient ability, motivation and time to demonstrate the solution to others.  
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High demonstrability of solutions may be an important ingredient explaining the relative 
success of groups over individuals across a range of existing experimental findings.
5 To 
appreciate this, imagine a decision environment with a task that has a correct solution and think 
of an individual decision maker as a degenerate group of size one. When the probability that at 
least one person in any group will know the solution increases with group size, then groups will 
inevitably have a higher probability of identifying the correct solution so long as solutions are 
demonstrable and those ‘in the know’ are willing to pass on what they know.
6 
But it is far from obvious that demonstrability is characteristic of most, or even many, of 
the settings in the world where individuals typically seek advice from others. Consider for 
instance, our opening examples related to financial, hiring or medical decisions. These types of 
decisions are qualitatively different from ‘eureka-type’ decision problems where a correct 
solution can be recognized via the application of a suitable system of reasoning. On the contrary, 
even ‘experts’ or ‘professionals’ often encounter difficulties in providing compelling arguments 
in defense of their estimations of, say, the profitability of a particular investment, the research 
publication potential of a newly appointed professor, or the risks associated with a new drug 
treatment. Indeed, such cases are often characterized by disagreements in the assessments of 
professionals and it can be difficult for someone seeking advice to decide who has the most 
accurate assessment, or perhaps equivalently, who is the most expert or informed advisor.
7 In 
part this may be due to the fact that the best alternative, ex post, may depend on some state of 
nature which is unknown at the point of decision. In fact, one might question whether, ex ante, it 
is meaningful to speak of there being a right answer at all in such cases. But even in many 
decision problems where it is meaningful to speak of there being a correct answer (e.g., a jury 
member trying to decide whether evidence against a defendant is compelling; or an analyst 
estimating the actual revenue of a company), there may not be any formal systems of reasoning 
                                                            
5 This point is also made by, e.g., Hastie (1986), who reviews the social psychology literature comparing group and 
individual behavior in relation to tasks with varying degrees of solution demonstrability. Whereas groups clearly 
outperform individuals in tasks where solutions are easily demonstrated, the comparison is less clear in tasks where 
solutions are more difficult to demonstrate: here groups seem to perform slightly better than the average individual, 
but usually below the level of the best performing individual. 
6  In the context of environments that feature demonstrably correct solutions, the propensity for groups to 
‘outperform’ individuals may thus be interpreted as at least a partly statistical phenomenon. It is a matter of ongoing 
debate, originating with Lorge and Solomon (1955), as to whether there is any improving effect of group 
membership beyond this (for more recent commentary on this point see Charness et al., 2010).  
7  As a practical illustration consider the difficulties interpreting the often conflicting advice about the risks of 
drinking alcohol during pregnancy (see, e.g., http://www.nhs.uk/news/2007/October/Pages/Pregnancyandalcohol.aspx).  
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that clearly identify, or unambiguously validate it. This suggests practical obstacles to 
demonstrability in potentially many cases of applied interest. 
What effects could consultation have in environments where demonstrability is low? We 
propose a simple model of consultation which suggests that, whereas agents who consult will 
improve their chances of success whenever demonstrability is high, consultation within a group 
could worsen subsequent individual decision making when demonstrability is low. Consider a 
task with n possible answers and a uniquely correct solution.
8 There are three types of agents 
whom we label: ‘expert’, ‘naïve’ and ‘mimics’. We consider two variants of the model, one with 
and one without consultation. In the model without consultation, each individual selects an 
action according to a fixed probability: ‘experts’ choose the correct answer with qexpert = 1; 
‘naive’ agents choose at random selecting the correct solution with probability qnaïve = 1/n; and 
‘mimics’ choose the correct solution with a probability intermediate
9 between that of the experts 
and the naive (i.e. 1/n < qmimics < 1). We model consultation as a two-stage decision process: in 
the first stage, each agent announces an intention generated according to the probability 
governing their own type; in the second stage, the experts and the naïve agents follow their 
intentions, but the mimics copy the actions of some subset of the other agents. We assume that 
the class of agents they copy depends on the demonstrability of the correct solution. Specifically, 
in decision problems with a fully demonstrable solution, we assume that mimics copy the 
‘experts’ (on the grounds that experts can demonstrate the right answer) and hence select the 
correct solution with probability one. In decision problems without an obviously demonstrable 
solution, we assume that mimics will simply follow the majority intention.
10 In this case, it is 
easy to see that consultation can improve performance in populations where the ‘experts’ are 
sufficiently abundant, but in a population where the non-experts are prevalent, overall 
performance may worsen.  
                                                            
8 For the purpose of maintaining an unambiguous benchmark to evaluate performance, in this paper we focus on 
decision environments that do have correct solutions. 
9 As motivation for this, think of choice among complex set of mobile phone tariffs where for any individual there is 
some best tariff, but it is difficult to identify. Experts know the best option for any individual, naïve agents choose 
without discriminating, whereas mimics represent partially informed individuals who, say, research options using a 
subset of available information.  
10 Laughlin and Ellis (1986) propose that the number of individuals necessary to reach a collective group decision is 
inversely related to demonstrability. A single correct group member is necessary and sufficient to reach a correct 
group decision in tasks with highly demonstrable correct answers (e.g. mathematical problems), whereas pluralities 
or majorities are needed in tasks with correct answers that are not obviously demonstrable (e.g. estimation tasks), or 
in ‘judgmental’ tasks that do not have a correct answer (e.g. attitudinal or aesthetic judgments).  
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This model illustrates the interesting possibility that consultation within a group could 
worsen individual decision making in tasks with uniquely correct answers, but ones that are low 
on demonstrability. Of course, our model is very simple and based on arguably naïve 
assumptions (e.g. about the following behavior of mimics). So an obvious question is whether 
such negative effects of consultation actually operate in real decisions. This is precisely the 
question addressed in the study we report here.  
Our study focuses on an individual decision task that is designed to have a correct solution 
which is not obviously demonstrable. We observed individual decisions in this task comparing 
behavior across two treatments. In one treatment, before facing the decision, subjects had the 
opportunity to discuss the task with other participants. We compare decisions made by these 
subjects with participants in a control group who had no opportunity to discuss the task with 
others. Because, in both treatments we observe individual answers to the task, our study differs 
from of the literature which compares the decisions of groups with those of single individuals. 
Instead, our study focuses on whether deliberating with others has an impact on subsequent 
individual decision making. 
Section 2 describes the experimental design. We report our results in Section 3. Our 
primary findings are that subjects who discuss the decision task with their teammates believe that 
the deliberation has helped them, but they actually perform significantly worse and earn 
significantly less. The negative effects of group interaction on performance are particularly 
marked for females. Section 4 concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN & PROCEDURES  
Our decision task is designed such that i) there exists a correct solution known to the 
experimenter such that it is possible to establish a meaningful benchmark for performance; ii) at 
least some of the participants may be expected to have knowledge of the correct solution, such 
that there is scope to analyze the extent to which knowledge is transmitted via consultation; iii) 
crucially, solution demonstrability is low in the sense that proposed solutions cannot be validated 
via a formal system of reasoning that is commonly shared by participants. All of the subjects in 
our experiment faced a pair of decision problems in which they were asked to consider two 
paintings. For each painting subjects had to select which of two artists, Paul Klee or Wassily  
6 
 
Kandinsky, had made the painting.
11 Subjects had a clear incentive to answer correctly, if they 
thought they knew the right answer, because they received £1.50 for each correct answer (and 
nothing for any incorrect answer). Figure 1 shows the computer screen that subjects used to 
submit their answers. 
Figure 1 – The Decision Task 
 
We contend that this task has relatively low demonstrability
12 because, in comparison to 
tasks which have demonstrably correct answers, the solutions to our painting tasks cannot be 
identified via the application of any system of reasoning that would be commonly understood by 
our subjects.
13  
Each subject took part in one of two treatments which we refer to as the Individual and 
Team treatments. In the Team treatment, the decision task was preceded by a ‘team discussion’ 
stage in which subjects were randomly divided into three teams of six. After being assigned to a 
team, subjects had the opportunity to discuss the task with their teammates before submitting their 
answers. Team interaction lasted for 5 minutes during which time subjects could communicate 
with the rest of their team via a team-chat program. Subjects were told that they could use the 
                                                            
11 The two paintings were Monument in Fertile Country, 1929 by Paul Klee (painting A in the experiment), and 
Weighing, 1928 by Wassily Kandinsky (painting B). A similar task is also used by Chen and Li (2009) as part of a 
social identity manipulation.  
12 Our task is similar in spirit to some of the low-demonstrability tasks used in the social psychology literature, such 
as world knowledge questions (e.g. what is the capital city of Lithuania) or estimation tasks (e.g. what is the 
population of China). 
13 We do not rule out the possibility that there may be arguments that a community of art experts might recognize as 
identifying the correct responses to our task (perhaps involving, for example, references to the style of brush strokes 
used by the different artists). Our subjects, however, were not selected on the basis of, or expected to have, any 
particular expertise in art history. Section 3 presents some analysis of how much knowledge our subjects in fact had, 
which supports this expectation.   
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chat-program to discuss the decision task and to get help from, or offer help to, other members of 
their team. They knew that messages were only shared among the members of their own team. At 
the end of the 5 minutes, subjects were shown the computer screen reproduced in Figure 1, and 
they individually submitted their answers. In the Individual treatment there was no ‘team 
discussion’ stage, and subjects were directly shown the decision task.  
Note that in both treatments subjects made private decisions as individuals. Thus, our study 
provides a controlled test of whether being able to interact and discuss the decision task with 
others has an impact on subsequent individual performance as compared to a baseline situation 
(the Individual treatment) where team deliberation is not possible.  
The decision-task reported here was the first part of a larger experiment and was followed 
by a one-shot sequential principal-agent game which is not related to the question examined in 
this paper. Subjects were informed at the beginning of the session that the experiment consisted 
of two parts, but detailed information about the second part was only given once everyone had 
completed the first part. At the end of the second part of the experiment, subjects completed a 
short post-experimental questionnaire eliciting basic demographic and attitudinal information. 
This included a self-assessment of subjects’ risk and trust attitudes. Risk attitudes were elicited 
using the SOEP general risk question discussed in Dohmen et al. (2011). The question reads: 
“Are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking 
risks?”, and subjects answered on a scale from 0 (risk averse) to 10 (fully prepared to take risk). 
Trust attitudes were elicited using the WVS Trust question (“Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”), to 
which they replied either by saying that they believe that “most people can be trusted” or that 
one needs “to be very careful in dealing with people”.
14 In the data analysis, responses on these 
two questions will enter as controls in a regression of subjects’ responses to the painting task.
15 
At the start of the experiment subjects were randomly seated at visually separated computer 
terminals and were given a written set of instructions that the experimenter also read aloud 
(instructions are reproduced in Appendix A). The experiment was conducted using the software 
                                                            
14 The average response to the SOEP risk question was 5.89 (s.d. 2.18). Responses to the WVS Trust question reveal 
that about 48% of our subjects believe that “most people can be trusted”. 
15 While we do not have any especially strong priors here, the WVS trust measure might proxy the extent to which 
individuals are prepared to follow the advice of others and, on some conjectures, the SOEP risk measure might 
correlate with patterns in responses to the two tasks (for instance, a risk averse agent who believed that the two 
paintings were by different artists, but could not identify which painted which, may prefer to give the same answer 
in both tasks). In the analysis, however, we find no evidence that these measures have any predictive power.   
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z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects were students from a wide range of disciplines recruited 
through the online recruitment system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). We conducted 19 sessions in 
total (15 in the Team treatment and 4 in the Individual treatment), with 18 subjects in each 
session. Consequently, we observed individual decisions of three-hundred and forty-two subjects: 
two-hundred-and-seventy subjects in the Team treatment and seventy-two in the Individual 
treatment. The average age of the participants was 20.2 years and 50% were female. No subject 
took part in more than one session. Subjects’ earnings from the first part of the experiment 
ranged from £0.00 to £3.00, averaging £1.34. Subjects were paid in private and in cash at the end 
of each session. 
3. RESULTS 
3.1 Does consultation improve decision making? 
Figure 2 shows the distribution of correct answers submitted in the Individual and Team 
treatments. In the Individual treatment (top panel of Figure 2) 38% of the subjects answer 
correctly to both painting questions, 33% answer correctly to one question and 29% submit two 
wrong answers. We note that if individuals chose entirely at random half of all subjects would be 
expected to get one question right, 25% of subjects would get both questions right and the 
remaining 25% would get none right. We can confidently reject the null that subjects in 
individual treatment choose at random (χ
2 goodness of fit test: p = 0.000). It is apparent from 
Figure 2 that fewer than the expected 50% of subjects get only one question right (p = 0.006 on a 
binomial test) and more than the expected 25% of subjects get two questions right (p = 0.020 on 
a binomial test). This shows that there is some knowledge of the correct answer in our subject 
pool, but knowledge is clearly far from perfect. Overall, these features of the distribution suggest 
that our task is satisfactorily calibrated for the purpose of investigating the extent to which 
imperfect knowledge is conveyed through group discussion.
16  
Turning to the Team treatment, note that, whereas the fraction of subjects answering 
correctly to both painting questions is similar to that in the Individual treatment
17 (36% in Team 
                                                            
16 If choices in this treatment were either indistinguishable from random behavior, or very close to perfect, that 
could reduce the scope for observing any effects of group discussion that might be observable in less extreme 
environments.  
17  Note that, as in the Individual treatment, observations in the Team treatment are also decisions of single 
individuals, albeit preceded by team discussion.   
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vs. 38% in Individual), the two treatments differ markedly in the proportions of subjects with 
either zero or one correct answer. In Team, the proportion of subjects submitting two wrong 
answers is 51% (29% in Individual), while only 13% of subjects submit one correct answer (33% 
in Individual). We can strongly reject the hypothesis that the distribution of correct answers is 
the same across the two treatments: χ
2(2df) = 18.91; p < 0.001. In the aggregate, subjects who 
participated in the group discussion were less successful (in terms of the average number of 
correct choices or, equivalently, the average earnings) than those who did not. In terms of 
earnings, subjects in the Team treatment earned, on average, 22% less than those in the 
Individual treatment, and the difference is significant at the 5% level according to a two-sided 
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (z = 2.14; p = 0.032).  

























Number of Correct Answers  
We further examine the distributions of correct answers across treatments using regression 
analysis that allows us to control for observable differences across subjects. We use a 
generalized ordered logit regression model where the dependent variable describes whether a 
subject answers correctly to zero, one or two questions.
18 In Model I we only use a dummy 
variable assuming value 1 if the subject was in the Team treatment, and value 0 if the subject 
                                                            
18 The generalized ordered logit regression model allows to relax the ‘parallel regression assumption’ of the standard 
ordered logit model whereby the coefficients that describe the relationship between, e.g., submitting zero correct 
answers versus submitting one or more correct answers are the same as those that describe the relationship between 
submitting two correct answers versus submitting zero or one correct answers, etc. (see, e.g. Long and Freese, 
2006). This assumption is violated for the three regression models presented in Table 1 according to a Brant test (in 
all models p < 0.05). The test also showed that the largest violations were for the treatment dummy. Thus, we used 
the command gologit2 in STATA 11 to estimate generalized ordered logit regressions where the parallel regression 
assumption was relaxed for the treatment dummy and maintained for other regressors.  
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was in the Individual treatment. Model II expands Model I by adding controls for subjects’ 
personal characteristics (gender, a dummy variable indicating whether a subject studies 
Humanities, and a self-assessment of the subject’s risk and trust attitudes), and for session effects. 
Model III expands Model II by introducing interaction terms between the treatment dummy and 
the other regressors. Table 1 reports the regression results, displayed as factor changes in the 
odds of answering correctly.
19  
Table 1 – Regression Analysis of the Number of Correct Answers across Treatments 
  I II  III 




At least one 

























1 if Studies 
















Team * Male  -  -  2.312
* 
(.096) 
N. 342  342  342 
Wald χ2 11.47  15.12 20.84 
Prob > χ2 0.003  0.034  0.053 
Pseudo R
2 0.025  0.029  0.039 
Generalized ordered logit regressions. The dependent variable is the number of correct answers submitted by a 
subject. The results are displayed as factor changes in the odds of answering correctly. P-values are reported in 
parentheses. Standard errors are adjusted for intragroup correlation (a subject’s team is used as the independent 
clustering unit; in the Individual treatment clusters have size 1 and coincide with the subject). A constant is included 
in all models, but omitted from the Table output. For the treatment dummy ‘Team’ the parallel regression 
assumption is relaxed and the models report both the factor change in the odds of answering correctly to at least one 
question, and the factor change in the odds of answering correctly to both questions. In Model II and III the 
reference subject type is: in the Individual treatment, female, studying a discipline other than Humanities, classified 
as someone who believes that one needs “to be very careful in dealing with people”. Model III includes all possible 
interactions between the Team variable and the other regressors, but only interactions significant at the 10% level 
are reported in the Table. In Model III the ‘continuous’ variables (Risk Seeking and Session) are centered at their 
mean before being interacted with the treatment dummy. Significance levels: * 10% ; ** 5%; *** 1%. 
                                                            
19 Note that a factor change greater than 1 implies a positive effect on the odds of answering correctly whereas a 
factor change smaller than 1 implies a negative effect.  
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Model I shows that being in the Team treatment reduces substantially (by a factor of 0.39) 
the odds of submitting at least one correct answer. The estimates reveal that, whereas in the 
Individual treatment we expect to find approximately 2.43 subjects submitting at least one 
correct answer for every subject who submits no correct answer, in Team the same statistic falls 
to only 0.96. This effect is significant at the 1% level. Being in the Team, however, has only a 
relatively small and insignificant impact on the odds of answering correctly to both questions 
(the odds are reduced only by a factor of 0.92, p = 0.810). This is consistent with the intuitively 
plausible idea that those who actually know more are less likely to be swayed by the crowd.  
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls for personal characteristics and session 
effects (Model II). In particular, note how the negative effect of the treatment on the odds of 
submitting at least one correct answer remains large and statistically significant at the 5% level. 
The regression also shows that there is no clear relationship between any of the controls 
introduced in Model II and the propensity to answer correctly. 
In Model III we interact the treatment dummy with the regressors used in Model II. Among 
the interaction terms, only the interaction between the treatment and the gender dummy is 
significant at the 10% level. Interestingly, the model reveals that being in the Team treatment is 
especially detrimental for female subjects: the odds of submitting at least one correct answer are 
reduced dramatically for female participants (by a factor of 0.09), and the effect is highly 
significant (p = 0.007). The effect is smaller for male participants (the odds decrease 
approximately by a factor of 0.20), and it is only marginally significant (χ
2(1df) = 3.45; p = 
0.063). Moreover, Model III shows that, for female subjects, being in the Team treatment also 
reduces the odds of answering correctly to both questions although the effect is only significant 
at the 10% level (the effect is insignificant for males). 
3.2 The unrecognized curse of consensus  
Why would the opportunity to consult with others have generated lower performance? In 
the introduction, as part of the motivation to our study, we sketched a simple model which 
generated that outcome. Central to our model was a tendency for individuals who know a little to 
be lured by a crowd that knows less.  
A very striking feature of our data is a tendency for subjects in teams to give the same 
answers to the painting questions as those given by their teammates. In approximately 84% of 
teams, an absolute majority of team members submitted identical answers to the two questions.  
12 
 
In about a third of the teams (14 out of 45), all six team members submitted the same answers; in 
the other 24 teams a majority of four or five members submitted identical answers, with one or 
two ‘outsiders’ submitting different answers. This tendency arose even though participants 
submitted their answers individually,  in private, and with no mention anywhere in the 
experimental instructions that a team had to reach a consensus. 
A second interesting feature of team responses is that whether or not a team had reached a 
consensus is strongly associated with subjects’ evaluations of whether communicating with the 
other team members was a helpful input to the decision task. At the end of the experiment, but 
before being informed about the outcome of the decision task, subjects in the Team treatment 
were asked to rate how much they thought that communicating with their team members had 
helped them solve the two painting questions. They responded on a scale from 1 (‘not at all 
helpful’) to 10 (‘extremely helpful’)
20 and from these responses we construct, for each team, a 
helpfulness index which is the mean of reported values for each team. For the 14 teams where 
every team member submitted the same answer to the painting questions, the average helpfulness 
index is 6.56. This falls to 4.75 in the 24 teams where there is a majority of four or five team 
members submitting identical answers, and it falls to 2.40 in the 7 teams where there was no 
solution submitted by an absolute majority. Both reductions are highly significant based on two 
sided-Wilcoxon rank-sum tests which produce p = 0.003 for the first comparison and p = 0.004 
for the second. 
The sting in the tail is that the poor performance of subjects in the Team treatment relative 
to those in the Individual treatment seems to be driven by those subjects who gave answers that 
are also submitted by the absolute majority in their team. If we exclude from the Team data all 
those subjects who formed part of a majority, we then find no significant difference between the 
average earnings of this subset (£1.438) and the average earnings of those in the Individual 
treatment (£1.625) (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.92; p = 0.355). By contrast, average 
earnings in the Team treatment of those in majorities (£1.203) is significantly lower than the 
average earnings for the Individual treatment (two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 2.43; p = 
0.015). Of course, it is possible that this inferior performance of majorities relative to subjects in 
the Individual treatment just reflects some form of sorting according to knowledge, which results 
in relatively low representation of the better informed individuals amongst majorities. If so, it 
                                                            
20 The average response was 4.95 (s.d. 3.17).  
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would not necessarily suggest any negative performance effect of being associated with a 
consensus per se. But while such sorting might account for some of the differential for 
comparisons between subsets of subjects in the Team treatment and subjects in the Individual 
treatment, it cannot explain the overall differences in performance between treatments reported 
in the previous sub-section.  
The face value interpretation of these data seems to be that consensus makes you feel good 
and perform worse. There is of course considerable evidence from social psychology that 
individuals have a strong tendency to form consensus, even when there is no basis for it.
21 But an 
intriguing question is why consensus answers perform poorly in our experiment; or, to put it 
differently, why majorities should have a tendency to coalesce around the wrong answers. While 
addressing this question takes us beyond the scope of the present study, we suggest a tentative 
hypothesis. It seems plausible to suppose that there may be a positive correlation between an 
individual’s confidence that they know the answer and their willingness and/or ability to promote 
their guess to others. Coupling this with evidence showing a positive correlation between 
overconfidence and incompetence (e.g., Kruger and Dunning, 1999) would then suggest a 
possible mechanism at work in our data: teams tend to follow the advice of those who are both 
most confident and less informed. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have reported an experiment designed to test the influence of consultation on individual 
decision making. Our work is partly motivated by an extensive background literature, briefly 
reviewed in the paper, which finds that groups often outperform individuals and we interpret our 
study as probing the conditions under which group interaction improves decision making. As we 
noted, most of the evidence supporting conclusions of the form ‘teams make you smarter’ or 
‘two heads are better than one’ comes from experiments comparing decisions made by groups 
versus decisions made by individuals. Such comparisons are intrinsically interesting, not least 
because many important decisions are made by groups (e.g. decisions of the UK Monetary 
Policy Committee; budgetary allocation decisions by the World Bank's Board of Executive 
Directors; etc.). However, we have argued that many interesting and important decisions where 
groups may play a role are better construed as individual decisions that involve an element of 
                                                            
21 For discussion of some early evidence see Sherif (1935).  
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consultation and part of our objective was to examine the extent to which the beneficial effects 
established for decisions made by groups extend to decisions made by individuals who consult. 
A second distinguishing feature of our experiment was the use of tasks with (correct) 
solutions that are low on demonstrability. This design feature had a number of connected 
motivations discussed in the introduction and reviewed here. The first stems from recognizing 
that the bulk of evidence pointing to beneficial effects of group decisions might be partly a by- 
product of experimental designs featuring tasks with high demonstrability. Indeed, when tasks 
have fully demonstrable solutions then, by definition, those who have knowledge of them can 
convey their knowledge to others. As such, adopting tasks with low demonstrability can be seen 
as providing a tougher test of the extent to which the knowledge possessed by some members of 
a group can be successfully transmitted to other members of it. That test is relevant, not least, 
because many interesting decisions in the world – and, in particular, many of those where 
consulting is commonplace - tend to have low demonstrability. A final motivation flows from 
our simple model which illustrates how consultation could have perverse effects when 
demonstrability is low.  
Our primary finding is that beneficial effects of group participation do not extend to our 
environment. Our benchmark (Individual) treatment established that our subject pool had some 
knowledgeable participants. Yet those who had the opportunity to consult, on average, 
performed worse and earned less than those who did not. This negative effect of consultation 
seems to reflect a tendency for individuals to follow the, relatively poorly informed, crowd and it 
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APPENDIX A (not for publication) 
 
 
Preliminary Instructions [common in both treatments] 
Welcome! You are about to take part in a decision-making experiment. This experiment is run by 
the “Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics” and has been financed by 
various research foundations. 
 
There are other people in this room, who are also participating in this experiment. All 
participants are reading the same instructions and have been recruited in the same way. Likewise, 
everyone is participating in this experiment for the first time. It is important that you do not talk 
to any of the other participants during the experiment. If you have a question at any time, raise 
your hand and a monitor will come to your desk to answer it. 
 
This experiment consists of two parts: PART 1 and PART 2.  
 
In each part you will be asked to make one or more decisions. Decisions made in one part of the 
experiment will not affect decisions or earnings in the other part. 
 
You will be informed of any outcome (including your earnings) from PART 1 and PART 2 of 
the experiment only at the end of the session. Therefore everyone will make their decisions in 
PART 2 of the experiment without knowing any outcome from PART 1. 
 
Your earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
We will shortly give you instructions about PART 1 of the experiment. You will receive 
instructions about PART 2 once everyone in the room has completed PART 1 of the experiment. 
 
 
Instructions for the Decision Task [Individual Treatment] 
In PART 1 of the experiment you will be shown a screen with two paintings by two modern 
artists: Paul Klee and Wassily Kandisky. Your task in PART 1 of the experiment is, for each 
painting, to select the artist who you think made the painting. For each correct answer, you will 
be rewarded with £1.50. You will be paid in private and in cash at the end of the experiment. 
 









Instructions for the Decision Task [Team Treatment] 
 In PART 1 of the experiment you and 5 other participants will be randomly assigned to a group. 
In a moment, the experimenter will bring around a bag containing 18 plastic balls and ask each 
of you to randomly draw a ball from the bag. 6 balls in the bag have a SQUARE drawn on them, 
6 have a TRIANGLE drawn on them, and 6 have a CIRCLE drawn on them. Depending on your 
draw you will be assigned either to the SQUARE group, to the TRIANGLE group or to the 
CIRCLE group. Likewise, all other participants in the room will be assigned to a group 
according to their draw. Thus, there will be 5 other participants in your group. You will not learn 
the identity of the other participants in your group, during or after today’s session. 
 
Once every participant has been assigned to a group, a screen will appear showing you two 
paintings by two modern artists: Paul Klee and Wassily Kandisky. Your task in PART 1 of the 
experiment is, for each painting, to select the artist who you think made the painting. For each 
correct answer, you will be rewarded with £1.50. You will be paid in private and in cash at the 
end of the experiment. 
 
Before you begin making your choices, you will have 5 minutes to use a group chat program to 
get help from or offer help to other members in your own group. Messages will be shared only 
among the members of your own group. You will not be able to see the messages exchanged 
among the members of the other groups. People in the other groups will not see the messages 
from your group. Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in the 
lower box of the chat program. 
 
Restrictions on messages 
1.  You must not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to identify you 
(for example, your name, contact details or seat in the room); 
2.  You must not make any threats, insults or use any obscene or offensive language. 
If you violate these rules your payment will be forfeited.  
 
Please raise your hand if you have any questions. 
 
 